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Theeffect of money stock announcements on the Federal funds rate has
been attributed informally to the information conveyed by the
announcements about aggregate reserve demand. This "Aggregate Information
Hypothesis" explains the effect without reference to Federal Reserve
intervention in the funds market. In this paper I provide a formal model
of the Aggregate Information Hypothesis under lagged reserveaccounting.
The model relies on imperfect information in the funds market, andon
imperfect bank arbitrage of reserve demand between days of the week.
Some stylized facts are presented about funds rate behavior in theperiod
1980-1983.
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Princeton,NJ 085441. Introduction
This paper documents two puzzling features of Federal funds rate be-
havior under lagged reserve accounting in the early 1980's, and presents a
stylized model of the funds market which explains these features.
The first noteworthy fact which is analyzed is that day-to-day changes
in the rate within the statement week may be significantly positive or neg-
ative on average across weeks, and are serially correlated. This fact is
puzzling, as pointed out by Shiller, Campbell and Schoenholtz [1983], be-
cause banks must hold reserves to meet an average requirement over the
statement week. The funds rate is the daily price of holding reserves, and
one would expect banks to adjust their reserve holdings across days to
eliminate any predictable changes in the funds rate through the week. That
is, one would expect the funds rate to follow a martingale within the
statement week.1
Secondly, there has been a significant effect of Friday Ml money stock
announcements on the Federal funds rate. When the money stock, which is
announced with a two week lag, is announced to have been surprisingly
large, the funds rate has tended to rise.
The announcement effect on longer term interest rates may be explained
as the result of expected policy reactions (when Ml is high, the Fed is ex-
pected to tighten and raise real rates), or an expected change in policy (a
positive Ml surprise indicates a higher long-run money growth rate and
higher expected inflation).2 It is harder to explain the announcement ef-
1 This argument is unaffectedby the change from lagged to contemporaneous
reserve accounting in early 1984.
2 Roley and Walsh [1985]present a model of these effects.
—1—fect on the funds rate in this manner.The inflation story seems
implausible for an overnight rate, while the tightening story requires that
after a high money announcement the Federal Reserve reduces nonborrowed re-
serves at the end of a statement week relative to the beginning of the
week. It is hard to see why the Federal Reserve should behave in this way;
after all, it has some foreknowledge of the announcement, so that it could
tighten early in the week. This would reduce the interest rate response to
the announcement, something which the Federal Reserve has publicly said
would be desirable.
Shiller, Campbell and Schoenholtz [1983] proposed an alternative ex-
planation for the money announcement effect on the Federal funds rate.
They pointed out that under lagged reserve accounting, the announcement of
Ml from two weeks ago is an announcement of current aggregate demand for
bank reserves.3 Before the announcement, banks know their own reserve re-
quirements but not the reserve demand of other banks. If banks collective-
ly underestimate aggregate reserve demand, but know the position of the
supply curve for reserves, then the money announcement will raise the ex-
pected end-of-week funds rate. By the arbitrage argument given above, the
funds rate will rise immediately.
Nichols and Small [1985] have criticized this explanation, which they
call the "Aggregate Information Hypothesist' (AIH), on the following ground.
If the supply curve for reserves is known, as postulated by the AIH, then
the Federal funds rate in the first part of the week reveals the demand for
reserves in that part of the week. Nichols and Small argue that this is
In fact Ml contains public currency holdings and thus is not equivalent
to reservable deposits. For simplicity this distinction will be ignored
in what follows.
-2-tantamount to revealing aggregate reserve demand for the week as a whole,
so that the money stock announcement conveys no new information under the
AIH. -
Inthis paper I argue to the contrary, that a money announcementmay
convey information even if there is no uncertainty about the position of
the supply curve for reserves. This is possible because banksmay be un-
certain about the timing of other banks' reserve demands within the state-
ment week; thus the funds rate in the first part of the week reveals "ear-
ly" reserve demand but does not necessarily reveal "late" reserve demand.
The formal model which illustrates this point also generates predictable
changes in the funds rate through the week. Such deviations from martin-
gale behavior are a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the Aggre-
gate Information Hypothesis as modelled here.L
The model of this paper should not be interpreted as a complete de-
scription of all the factors which affect the Federal funds market. Rath-
er, it is a highly stylized representation of one aspect of Federal funds
rate determination. Relevant empirical results on Federal funds rate be-
havior in 1980-83 are briefly presented in Section 2 of thepaper. Section
3 develops the formal model for lagged reserve accounting, and Section 4
concludes.
'Walsh[1983] presented a formal model of intraweek bank reserve demand
with some similarities to the one worked out here. The most important
difference is that in Walsh's model banks are uncertain about the supply
of reserves within the week, so that the model is not a pure illustration
of the Aggregate Information Hypothesis. Also Walsh focuses on aggregate
uncertainty of banks, rather than the individual bank's inference from
private and public information which is studied in this paper.
-3-2. Empirical Evidence, 1980-83
In this section I briefly present some evidence that the Federal funds
rate has not followed a martingale within the week, and that it was affect-
ed by money stock surprises in the lagged reserve accounting period. Table
1 summarizes funds rate behavior in a 4-year period from the 8th week of
1980 (when the money announcement was moved from Thursday to Friday) to the
last week of 1983. Lagged reserve accounting was in effect throughout this
period, and the statement week ran from Thursday to Wednesday. Statement
weeks in which the funds market was closed for a holiday on any day are
omitted from the sample, leaving 170 observations. The sample is broken in
half at the end of 1981; the two subsamples have 83 and 87 observations re-
spectively. Money stock surprises are measured as the difference between
announced Ml and the median forecast from a survey taken by Money Market
Services, Inc., on the previous Tuesday. Funds rates, obtained from the
Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, are
measured as "effective" rates, that is as daily trade-weighted averages.
Some statistical problems arise in testing the martingale hypothesis
using this measure of the Federal funds rate.If the funds rate takes a
single value each day (perhaps with noise specific to each transaction dur-
ing the day), and changes systematically overnight, then the daily average
data corresponds to point-in-time data and changes in daily averages should
be unpredictable under the martingale hypothesis. If on the other hand the
funds rate opens each day at the previous day's closing price, but evolves
continuously during the day, then under the martingale hypothesis the daily
average data have the properties described by Working [l960}. Changes in
Strictly speaking Working's results apply to random walks with constant
-4-daily averages should have first-order serial correlation of 0.25 and high-
er-order serial correlations of zero under the martingale hypothesis.
Rather than rely on one or the other interpretation of the fundsrate
data, I show that the martingale hypothests for the funds rate can bere-
jected under either interpretation. The first four rows of Table 1 present
summary statistics for daily changes in the funds rate within the statement
week. Under either interpretation of the dailyaverage data, if the funds
rate were a martingale mean daily changes would all be insignificantly dif-
ferent from zero. However in the full sample and each subsample two out of
four mean daily changes are significantly different from zero at the5%
level.There is a predominance of negative signs, indicating that the
funds rate tends to fall through the statement week.
The last four rows of Table 1 summarize some regressions which de-
scribe the dynamics of funds rate behavior. In rows 5 to 7 Iregress the
change in the funds rate on the previous day's change. Standard errors in
parentheses are the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors proposed
by MacKinnon and White [1984]. These have desirable finite-sample as well
as asymptotic properties.They are uniformly larger than the unadjusted
standard errors, and thus represent a conservative evaluation of thesig-
nificance of the coefficients.
In row 5 the previous dayts funds rate change is shown to have a high-
ly significant positive effect on the funds rate change from Tuesday to
Wednesday, in the full sample and both subsamples. The lagged change is
almost as significant in row 6, with the exception of the second subsample.
innovation variance. The variances of daily average funds rate changes
alter systematically through the week, as described below. This compli-
cation is ignored in what follows.
-5-In row 7, however, the change from Friday to Monday is shown to have an
insignificant correlation with the change from Thursday to Friday. The re-
gression of row 5 rejects the martingale hypothesis at the 5b/0levelfor ei-
ther interpretation of the daily average data; the regression of row 6 re-
jects it only if the daily averages are equivalent to point-in-time data.6
These results are consistent with those reported by Cornell [1983] for a
sample period roughly equivalent to the first subsample here.7
Row 8 shows that there is a significant contemporaneous reaction of
the funds rate to money announcement surprises, in the full sample and both
subsamples.8 The daily averaging problem does not affect the money an-
nouncement regressions, since the announcement occurs between trading days.
6 Results which are not reported, for lack ofspace, show that there is
significant second-order serial correlation of funds rate changes. This
is inconsistent with the martingale hypothesis, even if the daily average
data suffer from the Working problem.
Cornell stressed that there is negative serial correlation between the
change on the last day of one statement week, and the change on the first
day of the next week. This is not inconsistent with the martingale hy-
pothesis.
8 Regressions not reported foundno evidence of a lagged reaction to money
surprises.
-6-3.A Rational pctations Model of Reserve Demand
Under Lagged Reserve Accounting
In this section I develop a model of bank reserve demand which helps
to explain the observed features of funds rate behavior under lagged re-
serve accounting.9 In particular, the model generates predictable differ-
ences between the funds rate early and late in the statement week, and it
allows the existence of a money announcement effect on the funds rate
out assuming that the Fed reacts to announcements within the week.
The formal model treats the Federal funds rate as the cost to a bank
of holding its reserves on a particular day of the week. The justification
for this treatment is that the funds rate is the cost to an individual bank
of increasing reserves at one margin, or the benefit to it of reducing re-
serves at that margin. There are of course other margins where banks can
increase or reduce reserves; for example, they can borrow at the discount
window or sell securities. However at the optimum costs are equated at all
margins and the model uses the funds rate as an indicator of these costs.
Furthermore the funds rate is assumed to be the same for all banks; it
would be easy to generalize the model to allow for a constant difference in
funds rates across banks.
Under lagged reserve accounting, each bank j knows its overall reserve
requirement for the statement week, R., at the beginning of the week. The
bank must choose its reserve holdings for the first day of the week knowing
R. and the first-day federal funds rate,r1, but without knowing the funds
rate that will prevail later in the week.
Details of calculations are in an Appendix available from the author.
—7—For simplicity I divide the statement week into only two "days".'°
Then the bank must choose first- and second-day reserve holdings, R1. and
R .,subjectto R .+ R .R..If there were no costs associated with ad-
lj 2j j
justingreserves between the first and second days, the bank would simply
hold reserves on the day with the lowest (expected) federal funds rate.
This behavior on the part of all banks would eliminate any predictable
change in the rate from the first to the second day.
However there are predictable changes in the funds rate, and one can
imagine a number of reasons why banks find it costly to adjust the timing
of reserve holdings within the week. For example, there may be an invento-
ry motive for reserve holdings, to finance stochastic inflows to and out-
flows from a bank's reserve account. Rather than model this explicitly, I
simply introduce a first-day reserve "target", T1., together with a quad-
ratic cost of deviation from the target.Bank j chooses R1. to minimize
the cost function
2
(1) Mm C =r1R1.
+E.[r2](R-R1.)
+
Thefirst-order condition for this problem is
(2) R1.T1. +(l/x)[E.[r2]-r1]
It is apparent from (2) that >O is necessary if expected differences be-
tween r2 and r1 are not to generate unbounded shifts in reserve demand.
10 Amoney announcement is then modelled as a change from one equilibrium
to another in the first day, rather than as a real-time event occurring
between two days of the week. Walsh [1983] used a three-day model of
the statement week. This enabled him to model money announcements in
real time, at the cost of greater complexity in intertemporal aspects of
his model.
-8-The first-order condition (2) contains the banktsexpectation of the
second-day federal funds rate, E.[r2]. In order to model this expectation
as rational, we must state explicitly the information problem of the bank.
On the demand side, the bank knows R. andT1.. Suppose that
(3) R.a+u+s.
3 3
Here a is a constant, u is an aggregate shock affecting all banks (a shock
to the quantity of money two weeks earlier), and c. is anidiosyncratic
shock affecting only bank j. u and c. are normally distributed withzero
means and variances V and V respectively. If there are J banks in total,
I assume (l/J) X =0.Then average reserve demand across banks is R =
(l/J)Z R. =a+u.
Suppose also that
(4) T .=bR.+v+fl.
lj j 3
The first-day reserve targetT1. is some constant fraction b of the bank j
total reserve requirement, plus an aggregate shock v and an idiosyncratic
shock i.. v and T. are normally distributed with zero means and variances
V and V respectively. u, v, .and11.areall independent.I assume
(l/J) X ii.= 0.Then the average first-day reserve target across banks is
T1hR +v.
On the supply side, the Federal Reserve supplies reserves to the bank-
ing system as a whole according to some rule which I assume is constant
across the two days of the statement week, and known to individual banks at
the beginning of the week.11 For simplicity, assume this rule is linear in
Note that the supply function for reserves includes borrowedreserves;
thus the implicit penalty for discount window borrowing is incorporated
—9—the Federal funds rate:
(5) R. =c+ dr. i1,2 1
- 1
whereR. =(l/J)R...This supply schedule is consistent with the analysis
of Hetzel [1982], so long as the funds rate exceeds the discount rate. A
more complicated supply rule, perhaps of the intertemporal variety proposed
by Goodfriend [1983], could be analyzed without much change in the results
of the model, so long as the rule is known to banks and does not vary
through the week.
At the beginning of the week, each bank knows c and d and observes
so each bank knows R1. The information problem for the bank is to infer
whether first-day reserve demand is high because of an aggregate shock u to
overall demand R, or because of an aggregate shock v to the first-day com-
ponent of this demand. Bank j's knowledge of R. and T1. does not reveal
the values of u and v because of the idiosyncratic shocks .andTi..For-
3 3
mally, we can write E.[r2] =E[r2!I.],where I. ={R.,T1.,r1}.
Equations (2) through (5), together with the rational expectations
condition, the definitions of aggregates and the reserve constraint R1. +
R2. =R.,make up a complete model of the determination of reserve demand
within the statement week. The model is solved by applying the method of
undetermined coefficients.
First note that the first-order condition (3), when aggregated across
banks, implies
(6) c + dr1 =b(a+u)+ v + (1/cL) [E[r2]-r1]
into this supply function.
-10-where E[r2] =(l/J)Z E.[r21 is the average of individual banks?
expectations of r2. Equality of supply and demand for reserves on the sec-
ond day of-the week implies that
(7) c +dr2
=
R2
=R-
R1
=a+u-(c+dr1).
Now postulate that interest rates on the first and second days of the
week are linear in the underlying shocks to the model:
(8) r1 =1u+2v+
where and are coefficients which are as yet undetermined. From
(7) and (8),
(9) r2 =(l/d- - 2v+((a-2c)/d
-3).
Next postulate that bank fs expectation is linear in its information:
(10) E.[r2] = + 1T2T1. + ir3r1+
114
where 1Tl2'113 and 114 are also undetermined coefficients. The structure
of the model allows straightforward solution for the coefficients if we
know the itcoefficients,and vice versa.
The simplest case, which I solve first, is the perfect information
case: E.[r2] =r2for all j.Bankshave full information if either V or
V is zero, for then either u or v is revealed through equation (3) or (4),
and the remaining aggregate shock is revealed through observation of
r1.
The model as stated is degenerate if a is zero, because the first-or-
der condition divides zero by zero. However under one further assumption
it can be shown that banks have perfect information in this case. The as-
—11—sumption is that when banks have zero a, and expect no change in the funds
rate, they choose their first-day reserves as a deterministic linear func-
tion of the variables they observe, where the function is common across
banks.We may write R1. = + + 3r1.This equation may be
aggregated across banks, and since R1 =c+dr1,one can substitute out r1 to
get an equation which describes first-period reserve demand as a function
of the underlying shocks u and v. Taking expectations, the equation must
also hold for E[u] and E{vJ.
Since no bank expects a change in the funds rate, we have E.[r2] =
E[r2]
=
r1.It follows that reserve demand is expected to be equal on the
two days, so half of total demand for the week is expected on the first
day: R1 =(a+E[u])/2.The only values of the pparameterswhich satisfy
this condition have and R1(a+u)/2. It follows that in the equilibri-
um with a equal to zero, banks are fully informed and finance half their
reserve needs each day.
A similar argument can be used to show that for any value of a, if
each bank knows E[u} each bank is perfectly informed. Confusion arises in
this model when banks are uncertain about the aggregate of other banks' ex-
pectations.
The perfect information case is solved by substituting (8) and (9)
into(6). One obtains an equation which must hold for arbitrary u and v.
The valuesof the coefficients whichpermitthis are
and
*[a(l+bad)_c(2+ad)]/d(2+ad).
These results are fairly intuitive. A shock to overall reserve de-
mand, u, raises both r1 and r2: it raises them equally if b =1/2,for in
-12-this case banks wish to distribute their additional reserve demandequally
across days of the week, or if a =0.In these cases u does not affect the
difference betweenr1 and r2. A shock to the first-day reserve target, v,
raises r1 and lowersr2 so that the average of the two rates is unaffected.
vhasno effect on the funds rates if a =0,that is if banks are infinite-
ly willing to arbitrage across days of the week. When b =1/2or a 0,
the constant terms simplify to [a-2c]/2d for each equation. When b >1/2
for nonzero a,r1 tends to be greater than r2 on average across weeks, as
observed in the 1980-83 period.
The imperfect information case is more complex. The firststep in
solving it is to find the values of thecoefficients which are consistent
with given values of the ucoefficients.Aggregating equation (10) across
banks, and substituting it and equation (8) into equation (6), one finds
1b2+1r1/(l+ad-Tr3) and 2=(a+'ii2)/(l+ad-iu3). The value of is the same
as 3* above.
The next step is to obtain the iicoefficientsas functions of the
coefficients. Since r ,R.,T .andr are multivariate normal, one can 2 jlj 1
apply the formula for the forecast of a normal variable y conditional on a
vector of normal variables x. Lengthy calculations yield
1T2=[-cb12VVVJ/d, and
2 2
where V (V +V )+VV(V +V ) luv T2v u c
114 is determined so that the average value of E[r2] across weeks is the
same as the average value ofr2 under full information.
Substituting out for the 11coefficients,we obtain a pair of quadratic
equations 'land
-13-(11) =br2
+2vv[biv+2v]
=ad-12VVV
where r =(2+d)dA-V V (V +V ) lucV Ti
In general these equations may have multiple solutions. Rather than
attempting to analyze the model solution in the general case, I here exam-
ine small deviations from the full information case. If V or V is zero,
C Ti
and 2 are equal to and 2* What is the effect of a small increase
in V from zero? This can be answered by evaluating the derivatives of
(11) with respect to ,2and V, at the full information point. Further
lengthy calculations yield the following result:
(12) 1/V =-l/d(2+ad)V=-2/cdV
=(l+bad)/(d(2+cd)adV)=
Itmust be emphasized that these expressions are correct only at the full
information point. The variance of Ti does not appear in (12), but the un-
derlying calculations require that V1 0.Economically, if V1 =0then
banks have full information whatever the variance of s, and =
= 0.
The importance of equations (12) is that they show that l falls as
the equilibrium becomes noisy, while 2 increases. Intuitively, when the
equilibrium is noisy banks confuse u and v shocks. A u shock to overall
reserve demand is thought by each bank to be partly a v shock to the first-
day reserve target, which will lower the funds rate on the second day of
the week. Banks respond by shifting reserve demand to the second day, low-
ering the first-day funds rate; 'l is lower than under full information.
-14-Similarly a v shock, raising the first-day reserve target for all
banks, is thought by each bank to be partly a u shock to overallreserve
demand throughout the statement week. Accordingly banks do notfully an-
ticipate the decline in reserve demand and the funds rate that will in fact
occur on the second day of the week, and they shift less of their reserve
demand towards the second day. This keeps the funds ratehigh on the first
day, so is higher than under full information.
Confusion of this sort can explain why there is amoney announcement
effect on the federal funds rate, withoutany need to appeal to intra-week
shifts in reserve supply. We have noted that under laggedreserve account-
ing, a money announcement is an announcement of current aggregate reserve
demand R =a+u.Accordingly it shifts the funds market from the noisy
equilibrium to the fully informed equilibrium, without changingany real
conditions in the market.
One can derive some propositions about themoney announcement effect
even without the imperfect information model solution (12).First, from
the aggregated first-order condition (6), the change in thefirst-period
funds rateresulting fromthe announcementobeys 3r1/3A
=
(l/(l+cd))3E[r2]/3A.The money announcement does not change aggregate re-
serve demand for the week as a whole, so it can affect the first-day funds
rate only by changing the expected second-day funds rate in thesame direc-
tion.
Next, we note from equation (7) thatr1/aA =- ar2/3A,again because
the money announcement does not changeaggregate reserve demand for the
week. Thus if the move to the informed equilibrium raises thefirst-day
funds rate, it raises the expected second-day rate and lowers the actual
-15-second-day rate; in the informed equilibrium1 these two variables are
equal.
If we take expectations of(7), we find that E[r2}/3A =
(l/d)3E[u]/aA.The expected funds rate rises because banks increase their
estimates of aggregate reserve demand for the week. A positive surprise in
the money announcement (one which increases E[u]) raises the expected sec-
ond-day funds rate and thus the actual first-day funds rate. This is the
money announcement effect observed in the 1980-83 period.
From equation (8), we also know that 1aE[u}/3A =-2aE[v]/A.Banks
observed the first-day funds rate before the announcement; if they increase
their estimates of u they must decrease their estimates of v to remain con-
sistent with observed
r1.
The contribution of the imperfect information model solution is to
show for what values of u and v a positive money surprise (and thus an in-
crease in first-day rates) occurs. For an infinitesimally noisy equilibri-
um1 we can measure the money announcement effect on the first-day rate by
evaluating at the parameter values and the derivatives of l and
with respect to the variance of (or equivalently ii), the noise in the
system.
For such an infinitesimally noisy equilibrium, the effect of the an-
nouncement, A, on the first-period funds rate is
(12) r1/3A =-(1/aV)u
-(32/3V)v
=2u/udV
-
1*v/adV
Since l* and 2* are both positive, a positive money surprise occurs when
there is a high value of u and a low value of v; the low v "disguises" the
high u by offsetting its effect on the first-day funds rate.
-16-The model of this section has relied heavily on the institutional
framework of lagged reserve accounting. Since early 1984, this reserveac-
counting system has been superseded by contemporaneous reserve accounting.
It would be straightforward to alter the model to describe amoney an-
nouncement effect on the funds rate under the new regime. Under contempo-
raneous reserve accounting, banks do not know their required reserves for
certain until the end of the statement week; but each bank has some private
information early in the week about its own deposits and thus about its re-
serve requirement. The announcement of the money stock from two weeks ear-
lier is no longer an announcement of this week's aggregate requiredre-
serves, but if there is persistence through time in the money stock the
announcement does convey useful information about this magnitude. Thus the
necessary elements for the Aggregate Information Hypothesis are still pres-
ent under contemporaneous reserve accounting.
—17-4. Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that random shifts in banks' desired tim-
ing of reserve holdings can explain some otherwise puzzling features of
Federal funds rate behavior within the statement week.I have developed a
model for the lagged reserve accounting regime, in which such shifts gener-
ate predictable changes in the funds rate from one part of the week to an-
other. They also create confusion so that the funds rate does not perfect-
iy aggregate private information, and an announcement of the money stock
moves the market to a more informed equilibrium.In this model, a money
announcement may alter the Federal funds rate even when there is no uncer-
tainty about Federal Reserve supply behavior within the statement week.
-18-TABLE 1
DAILY FUNDS RATE BEHAVIOR
Row Variable 1980:8-83:521980:8-81:52 1982:1-83:52
Mean change
(Standard error of estimate)
(Standard deviation of change)
1
FED_FTUES -0.047 -0.206* 0.105*
(0.066) (0.121) (0.051)
(0.861) (1.109) (0.479)
2
FTUES_FMON -0.111* -0.180* -0.045
(0.038) (0.071) (0.031)
(0.499) (0.644) (0.286)
3
FMON_FFRI 0.020 0.027 0.013
(0.043) (0.074) (0.046)
(0.563) (0.677) (0.426)
4
FFRI_FTHURS _009** -0.101 -0.116**
(0.032) (0.057) (0.033)
(0.423) (0.519) (0.304)
Coefficient on previous dayts change
(Standard error)
(Regression R-Squared)
5FD_FTUES 0.628** 0.628** 0.448*
(0.174) (0.215) (0.217)
(0.132) (0.133) (0.071)
6
FTUES_FMON 0.387** 0.524** 0.063
(0.100) (0.109) (0.125)
(0.191) (0.304) (0.009)
7
FMQN_FFRI 0.052 0.089 -0.049
(0.120) (0.136) (0.264)
(0.002) (0.005) (0.001)
Coefficient on money surprise
(Standard error)
(Regression R-Squared)
8
FMQN_FFRJ 0.065* 0.072* 0.055*
(0.020) (0.034) (0.019)
(0.065) (0.065) (0.068)
Note:=significantat the 5% level, **= significantat the 1% level.
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